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This dissertation examines the effects of inside debt compensation on managerial risk-
seeking behaviour. Extant literature argues that besides equity and cash, managers are 
also compensated with debt-like instruments such as deferred compensation and 
pensions. These compensation components are typically unfunded and unsecured and 
expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by external debtholders (Edmans and 
Liu, 2011). As a result, managers with large inside debt holdings are expected to display 
lower financial risk tolerance (Cassel et al., 2012). Motivated by this argument, I first 
examine the effects of CEO inside debt compensation on corporate financial policy 
choices. I document a negative association between inside debt holdings and firm book 
leverage and a positive relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and firm solvency. 
Subsequently, I examine whether women, who are perceived to possess a risk profile 
similar to a manager with significant inside debt holdings receive similar inside debt 
compensation to men. However, I document no evidence of a difference in the inside debt 
compensation between genders.   
JEL classification: G31, G32, G33, J33  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Executive compensation is a complex and fascinating subject which has managed to 
remain relevant in academic literature and public debates for the better part of the past 
century. Following the global financial crisis, the high level of executive pay, and its often 
weak link to corporate performance has been treated by many as the main suspect for the 
near-collapse of the global financial system and has spurred intense discussions. Also, 
besides public scrutiny executive pay packages have provoked the reaction of regulators 
as well as institutional investors globally as evidenced by recent legislative initiatives 
such as the Dodd-Frank Act and the Government Pension Fund of Norway (often referred 
to as “The Oil Fund”) declaration to target high executive pay votes. 
The effect of executive compensation channels on corporate performance and how 
they can both mitigate or exacerbate agency costs has been an extensively discussed topic 
in academia. Prior literature on the subject primarily emphasises the role equity-based 
compensation instruments and managerial ownership and how they provide incentives to 
executives to exert greater effort or implement riskier investment and financial policies 
(Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006). Nevertheless, as recent empirical findings suggest, 
CEOs are also compensated in the form of pension allowances and deferred compensation 
(Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Wei and Yermack, 2011). Since these compensation 
instruments resemble unfunded and unsecured firm liabilities, they expose managers to 
default risk similar to that faced by external creditors. As a result, they are commonly 
referred in academic literature as inside debt.  
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According to previous research, CEOs with large inside debt holdings become more 
aligned with debtholders rather than shareholders (Edmans and Liu, 2011). In particular, 
when the CEOs become overly incentivised by inside debt, they tend to become more 
risk-averse. As a result, they take measures that reduce the risk levels of the firm and can 
potentially result in a transfer of wealth from shareholders to debtholders (Sundaram and 
Yermack, 2007; Wei and Yermack, 2011). 
Consistent with this argument, Eisdorfer et al. (2013) report that CEOs with 
significant inside debt holdings implement less risky investment policies. Furthermore, 
Cassel et al. (2012) also document a negative association between CEO inside debt 
holdings and firm investment policy risk. In addition, they examine the association 
between inside debt incentives and firm financial policies. However, while they document 
a negative relationship between inside debt incentives and firm leverage, their results are 
not entirely consistent with extant literature on executive compensation. More 
specifically, some of their control variable coefficients1 display signs that are inconsistent 
with their theoretical predictions. Furthermore, over 25% of their sample consists of 
utility and financial firms, which are known for their peculiar capital structure and 
regulated status (Fama and French, 1984).  
As a result, for my initial hypothesis, I proceed to re-examine the relationship 
between CEO inside debt holdings and firm financial policy risk in an updated 
multivariate setting. Furthermore, unlike Cassel et al. (2012), I employ a more 
comprehensive sample which covers the years 2006-2014 and also exclude financial and 
utility firms from my analysis. Overall, I document a negative and significant association 
                                                 
1 In particular, it is their CEO Vega/Delta ratio, a control for the equity incentives of the 
CEO that displays inconsistent signs in their regression analysis. 
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between CEO inside debt holdings and book leverage. I also report a positive and 
significant relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and firm interest coverage 
ratio (a measure of the firm’s ability to service its interest obligations in a given period). 
Collectively, my large sample analysis results are consistent with prior research which 
suggests that as the inside debt holdings of the CEO increase, he becomes more risk-
averse and implements safer corporate policies (Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassel et al. 
2012; Eisdorfer et al., 2013). 
Overall, in the large sample analysis, I document that inside debt compensation can 
affect the risk of corporate financial policies. At the same time, according to prior 
research, an additional factor which can affect the risk of corporate policy choices is the 
gender of the CEO (Faccio et al., 2015; Malmendier et al., 2011). Specifically, extant 
literature suggests that women are inherently more risk-averse relative to men, in 
particular with concern to financial risk (Huang and Kisgen 2013). Consistent with this 
argument, Martin et al. (2009) report a reduction in firm risk following the appointment 
of female CEOs, while they also argue that financially constraint firms are more likely to 
appoint a female CEO. These results are supported by Faccio et al. (2015) who document 
that female CEO firms display lower leverage levels and a higher probability of survival 
relative to male CEO firms. These findings suggest that gender can also condition the 
behaviour of the CEO and that women CEOs exhibit risk-averse behaviour even at top 
managerial positions. Therefore, one could argue that women CEOs tend to display 
similar characteristics with CEOs who hold significant inside debt holdings. Therefore, 
for my small sample analysis, I take advantage of this interesting premise and examine 
whether female CEOs are compensated with less inside debt compensation. Since female 
executives are perceived to inherently possess a lower risk tolerance, one could be 
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inclined to expect boards to compensate them with less inside debt. Nevertheless, I do not 
document any indication of a difference on the inside debt holdings between male and 
female CEOs. These results suggest that gender is not a determinant of inside debt 
compensation and are more in line with studies which suggest that gender pay disparities 
cease to exist when an individual achieves the rank of CEO (Bugeja et al., 2012). 
The remaining of this dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents a 
summary of the relevant literature on executive compensation and CEO inside debt and 
develops my main hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents my large sample analysis. My small 





Chapter 2  
Literature review 
2.1 The agency dilemma  
According to traditional agency theory, an agency refers to the relationship between 
two parties, the principal and the agent. In most cases, principals hire the agents’ services 
and allow them to take decisions on their behalf. However, by delegating some of their 
decision-making authorities, principals place their trust on the agent’s abilities but cannot 
guarantee that the latter’s course of action will be taken with their best interest in mind 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
This dilemma serves as the foundation of the agency problem and arises because the 
interests of the principal may not be congruent with those of the agent. In particular, 
shareholders invest their money in the company and wish to maximise their investment. 
At the same time managers, who shareholders hire to operate the firm on their behalf, 
invest their time and effort and naturally expect a return as well.  Thus, managers may 
often choose to behave in an opportunistic manner and take suboptimal actions to 
maximise their investments return at the expense of shareholder wealth (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Furthermore, even if shareholders are the owners of a firm, they only possess residual 
ownership over their companies’ assets. More specifically, an additional party who has 
an active interest is corporate assets are debtholders. Like shareholders, debtholders also 
invest in company operations by acquiring debt issued by the firm. In exchange for their 
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investment, they demand returns in the form of interest payments and also gain priority 
claim on the issuing firm’s assets in the event of bankruptcy. However, interest payments 
are typically based on the firm’s existing risk level at the date of the financing agreement 
and usually remain fixed subsequently. Thus, unlike shareholders whose payoffs are 
convex, debtholders possess limited upside potential in the value of their claims (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Therefore, in cases where firms 
perform exceptionally well, debtholder payoffs remain fixed whereas shareholder payoffs 
have unlimited upside potential. Furthermore, for any company with significant debt as 
the value of shareholders’ equity decreases debtholder stake in the enterprise increases. 
As a result, shareholders have incentives to take on riskier projects and shift the downside 
risk of their investments to debtholders. (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). 
In general, most corporations are leveraged and regularly employ external debt to 
fund their operations. Therefore, agency conflicts can also arise between shareholders and 
debtholders (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2013; Damodaran, 2010). These conflicts stem from 
the distance between the risk preferences of shareholders and debtholders and are known 
as agency conflicts of debt. In particular, agency conflicts of debt occur when managers 
increase firm risk through business investment and financing policies in ways that favour 
shareholders over debtholders (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994).  
 
2.2 The role of executive compensation  
Overall, conflicts of interest between managers and company stakeholders can result 
in agency problems (Damodaran, 2010). The expenses associated with mitigating these 
problems are known as agency costs. One the most prominent measures used to manage 
13 
 
agency conflicts and minimise these costs in corporations is executive compensation. 
Shareholders typically design executive compensation contracts with the purpose of 
aligning their interests with the ones of managers. More specifically, in its capacity of 
addressing agency conflicts, the role of executive remuneration packages is threefold. In 
particular, its purpose is to attract talented individuals at the lowest possible cost; reduce 
executive turnover and motivate executives to take value-adding actions that will 
maximise the wealth of shareholders.  
Executive compensation packages typically involve a mixture of short-term and 
long-term incentives. The most commonly identified part of compensation packages is 
base salary, which corresponds to the standard wage paid to an executive and typically 
takes the form of cash. In addition to base salary, managers often receive bonuses for 
achieving corporate set milestones. These bonuses are usually cash-based or equity-based 
and serve as short-term incentives. Furthermore, executives also enjoy non-pecuniary 
rewards that involve benefits and perquisites such as the use of corporate jets and 
chauffeur services. Finally, corporations use incentives that are tied to equity or enterprise 
value to align the interest of managers with the long-term corporate wellbeing (Murphy, 
1999). 
2.2.1 Executive compensation equity incentives 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), to mitigate agency conflicts with 
managers, shareholders should tie the wealth of the former group to the value of the firm’s 
equity. One of the ways shareholders can achieve this is through the use of equity-based 
pay. What sets equity-based compensation apart from other pay package components is 
the fact that it does not explicitly involve cash but uses equity-based instruments like 
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stock, restricted stock and stock options as employee compensation. As a result, it 
provides a direct link between the interests of shareholders and managers since executives 
receive ownership rights of the firm instead of cash (Murphy, 1999). Therefore, equity-
based incentive compensation can increase the sensitivity of the CEOs wealth to the stock 
price, also known as delta which can reduce agency conflicts of equity (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). Overall, equity incentives can reduce agency conflicts of equity also urge 
managers to exert more effort and increase the value of equity since their rewards are tied 
directly to the firm’s stock performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). 
However, besides directly linking the rewards of managers to the wealth of 
shareholders, equity-based compensation also shifts some of the risks borne by the latter 
group to the former. In particular, equity incentive compensation exposes executives to 
additional risks since a part of their wealth is in the form of equity-based instruments. 
Unlike shareholders who can be considered as risk neutral since they are well diversified, 
managers are often undiversified and potentially disallowed from hedging their risk by 
being required to maintain a specific shareholding in their companies. Therefore, if the 
company underperforms, their rewards will decline, and their shareholding will hold a 
lower nominal value.  
As a result, equity-based compensation can not only tie their rewards to corporate 
performance but also make them more risk-averse. To reduce the equity-induced risk-
aversion of managers, equity-based compensation can be structured to increase the 
sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock-return volatility. Specifically, shareholders 
provide equity instruments to managers’ that can structure the latter group’s payoffs to be 
a convex function of firm performance. Therefore, by increasing the sensitivity of the 
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CEOs wealth to the volatility of the firm’s performance, also known as Vega, 
shareholders can mitigate the risk aversion that can result from high delta and incentivise 
the manager to implement riskier corporate policies (Coles et al., 2006). 
As was mentioned before, in the modern corporate setting agency relationships are 
complex and often involve more parties, like debtholders. These parties all invest in 
different ways in corporations and naturally demand a return on their investments. In that 
effect, executive compensation besides mitigating some agency conflicts may very well 
exacerbate others. In particular, although equity-based incentive compensation is 
designed to align the interests of managers and shareholders, it can also incentivise them 
to do so at the expense of other stakeholders, and in particular debtholders (Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1994). However, this can result in increased agency costs of debt. Specifically, 
to safeguard their position and avoid potential expropriation of their wealth, bondholders 
take protective measures like demanding higher interest rates or imposing restrictive 
covenants (Chava et al., 2010). Therefore, to mitigate these agency costs of debt, prior 
literature suggests that shareholders should try design managerial compensation contracts 
that induce managers to consider the interests of debtholders (Brander and Poitevin, 
1992). 
 Consequently, for the corporation to mitigate agency costs resulting from both 
equity and debt, managerial interest alignment levels need to be in equilibrium with not 
only the interests of firm owners’ but also the interests of debtholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisdorfer et al., 2013). As a result, the role of executive compensation 
in addressing agency problems becomes even more pronounced. 
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2.2.1 Inside debt compensation incentives 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the first to introduce the concept of aligning 
managerial incentives with those of debtholders through the use of incentive 
compensation. In a brief section of their seminal study, they note that having the manager 
hold debt and equity in a similar proportion to that of the firm’s capital structure, can 
mitigate the risk-shifting problems associated with external debt. 
Recent theoretical investigation has revisited the work of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Edmans and Liu (2011) offer a theoretical framework to justify the use of debt as 
a channel of optimal pay. Furthermore, they argue that CEO inside debt holdings, denoted 
as the sum of the pension benefits and the deferred compensation of the CEO, are 
sensitive not only to the probability of bankruptcy but also to the liquidation value of the 
firm. Therefore, CEOs can face default risk similar to that of outside creditors when it 
comes to their inside debt position. 
Consistent with this theoretical prediction, Anantharaman et al. (2014) argue that 
pension and deferred compensation can effectively function as inside debt. However, they 
note that in order for these compensation components to constitute inside debt they need 
to be fixed and proportional to the firm’s liquidation value in the cases of solvency and 
insolvency respectively. In addition to they should not be senior to any other debtholder 
claims. 
Early literature on compensation rarely explored the impact of CEO debt holdings 
on managerial behaviour, focusing on the effect of equity-based compensation incentives 
instead. Nevertheless, according to recent studies, inside debt compensation is more 
widely adopted in publicly traded companies that otherwise believed. Specifically, Wei 
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and Yermack (2011) document that 84% of CEOs in their study are compensated with 
some form of inside debt.  
Along this line, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) report that for 13% of the CEOs in 
their sample the percentage of their debt stake exceeds the equivalent percentage of their 
equity stake. Furthermore, they argue that as their inside debt holdings increase, CEOs 
start to act more akin to a debtholder and take measures to reduce overall firm risk and 
the probability of a debt default.  However, it should be noted that they examine only the 
effect of CEO’s pension balances and do not take deferred compensation into account. 
Nevertheless, their findings suggest that inside debt compensation can align the interests 
of managers and debtholders and mitigate agency costs of debt.  
Overall, empirical results indicate that as the CEOs inside debt holdings increase, 
they become more aligned with bondholders and more risk averse (Edmans and Liu, 
2011). According to Wei and Yermack (2011), investors also seem to hold a similar 
opinion. In their study, they take advantage of the SECs new disclosure requirements 
concerning inside debt holdings in 2007 and examine the respective reactions of 
investors. They report a decrease in the value of equity and an increase in the value of 
debt for companies which report a high inside debt position for their CEOs. Furthermore, 
the stock volatility for these companies decreases in the following months, while their 
credit default swap spread also narrows. These results indicate that the market perceives 
companies where the CEO possesses a high relative leverage ratio as less risky. 
Furthermore, they also report that the decrease in equity value is larger than the increase 
in the value of debt. Therefore, these results suggest that when CEOs become overly 
incentivised by inside debt, they exhibit more conservative behaviour and take sub-
optimal decisions that can adversely affect shareholder wealth. 
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These findings are in agreement with Liu et al. (2014) who find that CEO debt-like 
compensation is associated with higher firm cash balances. Prior research suggests that, 
it is creditors who demand higher cash balances and asset liquidity as a countermeasure 
to managerial risk taking incentives (Liu and Mauer, 2011). Therefore, by building up 
their firm’s cash reserves, managers act more like creditors since they are effectively 
hedging the risk they run to lose their debt-like compensation by diminishing the 
likelihood of a credit event. However, shareholders may be negatively affected by this, 
since the most common option managers use to increase cash reserves without defaulting 
on any payments, is the reduction of pay-outs to equity holders or passing up the 
opportunity to invest in risky projects (Cassel et al., 2012; Eisdorfer et al., 2015).  
Consistent with this argument, Eisdorfer et al. (2013) report that as the CEOs inside 
debt holdings increase, they underinvest, which results in a transfer of wealth form 
shareholders to debtholders. At the same time, they report that when the managers’ equity 
position is significantly higher than their inside debt position, they over-invest and 
expropriate debtholders instead. Overall, they note that the personal leverage2 of the CEO 
can adversely drive their investment decisions and affect firm policies. As a result, they 
argue that agency conflicts stemming from both debt and equity may be mitigated when 
the relative leverage3 of top executives, is set as close to unity as possible.  
 
                                                 
2 Eisdorfer et al. (2013) follow Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and denote the CEOs personal leverage as 
their inside debt claims divided by their equity portfolio claims. 
3 According to Eisdorfer et al. (2013) the CEOs relative leverage is denoted as their personal leverage (CEO 
inside debt/ CEO equity holdings) divided by firm book leverage. 
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2.3 Hypotheses Development  
As mentioned above Eisdorfer et al. (2013) report that, as the CEOs relative leverage 
increases, they deviate from optimal investment policies and underinvest in order to 
reduce firm risk. In addition, Cassel et al. (2012) examine the association between CEO 
inside debt and financial and investment policy risk and report a negative association. In 
that effect, they argue that managers exercise their control over investment and financial 
policies to reduce the volatility of the firm’s performance. As a result, they posit that 
managers with a high CEO relative leverage will implement safer policies and try to 
reduce the overall debt burden of the firm to mitigate the probability of a credit event. 
Although Cassel et al. (2012) document a significant and negative relationship 
between inside debt incentives and firm investment policies, their results with regard to 
external firm financing policies are more ambiguous. More specifically, while their 
results are consistent with their theoretical prediction that inside debt induces CEOs to 
reduce their firm’s debt burden, the interpretations of their control variables are 
inconsistent with prior literature. A possible explanation for these inconsistencies is the 
construction of their sample. More specifically, over 21% of their sample consists of 
financial services companies. According to Fama and French (1992), financial firms deal 
with debt and financial instruments and as a result, possess significantly higher leverage 
than firms in other industries. Also, their sample covers the period 2006-2008 which 
corresponds to the global credit crisis. According to prior research, major financial crises 
can result in a period of deleveraging. More specifically, the 2007 global financial crisis 
triggered liquidity shortages which severely affected the ability of companies to draw 
funds from external creditors. As a result, a lot of companies had to involuntarily 
deleverage (Claessens et al., 2010). Therefore, it is possible the results documented by 
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Cassel et al. (2012) are driven by the construction of their sample. Taking these factors 
into consideration, I proceed to re-examine the hypothesis first introduced by Cassel et 
al. (2012) on the association between firm financial policies and CEO inside debt 
incentives using a more comprehensive research design and a different sample of 
observations.  
Consistent with prior theory on CEO inside debt holdings and risk-aversion, I expect 
firm leverage to be negatively associated with CEO inside debt holdings. More 
specifically, the increased risks of bankruptcy associated with high leverage should 
induce managers with high inside debt to reduce the debt burden of their firm, as a way 
of securing both their managerial position and inside debt claims.    
H1: There is a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and firm leverage  
Following the financial crisis, a matter of great concern was how companies, that 
were otherwise perceived to be healthy financially, were severely affected by the sudden 
economic downturn. Subsequently, firm solvency, which is the ability of a company to 
service its obligations and produce cash flows that are sufficient to meet its short-term 
and long-term liabilities, became a very hotly debated topic. A company that is insolvent 
will inevitably enter bankruptcy or reorganise. However, a firm can also enter bankruptcy 
when it lacks liquidity.  
Furthermore, prior literature suggests that CEOs with significant inside debt 
positions try to alleviate their firms’ debt burden and increase their firms working capital 
(Cassel et al., 2012). What they potentially aim to achieve by this is to reduce the 
probability that an unforeseen credit event takes place. More specifically, they increase 
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asset liquidity to ensure that even when an unexpected event affects company operations 
negatively, the firm will still be able to service its short-term obligations. 
A reduction in firm leverage will serve no purpose neither to highly leveraged 
managers nor stakeholders if it is not accompanied by sufficient operating cash flows to 
service its long-term as well as its short-term commitments. In this regard, a company’s 
ability to service immediate interest payments could be considered as an efficient proxy 
for firm solvency. 
Therefore, I extend the scope of my initial hypothesis and proceed to examine 
whether managers with large inside debt holdings take measures to increase their firm’s 
ability to service its short-term debt, so as to avoid any potential credit event. Therefore, 
for my second hypothesis, I expect a positive association between CEO inside debt 
holdings and firm financial sustainability. 




Chapter 3 Large sample analysis 




In this chapter, I focus on the risk-reducing effects of inside debt compensation on 
corporate policy choices. For this reason, I empirically examine the relationship between 
the inside debt incentives of the CEO and firm financial policies by conducting a 
multivariate regression analysis on two different model specifications. First, I examine 
the relationship between CEO inside debt incentives and firm book leverage. Second, I 
empirically examine the relationship between CEO inside debt incentives and firm 
solvency using the company’s interest coverage ratio (ICR) as a proxy. I document a 
negative association between CEO relative leverage and book leverage and a positive 
association between inside debt incentives and firm solvency; both relationships are 
statistically significant.  
3.2 Data and Sample Selection 
Since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) new disclosure requirements 
concerning pension and deferred compensation plans came into effect in 2006, my sample 
period is limited and covers the years 2006 to 2014. Consistent with previous research 
Utilities (SIC 4900–4999) and Financial firms (SIC 6000–6999) are excluded from the 
sample due to their highly regulated nature. Since I focus my analysis on the CEO’s 
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pension benefits and deferred compensation, I identify firms with complete inside debt 
data from the Execucomp database. Furthermore, I use accounting data from Compustat 
and CRSP to derive the dependent and control variables used in my analysis. All 
continuous variables are winsorised at their 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the 
influence of outliers4. After merging the databases and removing observations with 
missing values, my primary sample consists of 4,906 firm-year observations, representing 
815 individual firms. 
Table 1 provides the distribution of my sample firms across years. Overall, my sample 
company observations appear evenly distributed from 2006 to 2014.  
Table 1 
  
                                                 
4 For additional details on the calculation of all variables, the reader is referred to the Appendix. 
Sample distribution 
This table provides the sample distribution by year. Since the SEC’s expanded executive compensation disclosure requirements 
became effective for 2006 fiscal year-ends, the sample period begins in 2006. I collect observations from 2006 to 2014 and identify 
all firms with complete compensation data necessary to calculate the relative CEO leverage measures (from the Standard and 
Poor’s Execucomp database) and with sufficient information in the Compustat database to estimate the dependent and control 
variables in my models. Utility (SIC 4900–4999) and Financial firms (SIC 6000–6999) are excluded from the sample. As a result, 
my primary sample consists of 4,906 firm-year observations, representing 815 unique firms. 
Sample distribution by year    
Fiscal Year Frequency (N) Percent (%) Cumulative (%) 
2006 463 9.43 9.43 
2007 590 12.02 21.46 
2008 588 11.98 33.44 
2009 555 11.31 44.76 
2010 555 11.31 56.07 
2011 571 11.63 67.71 
2012 555 11.31 79.02 
2013 530 10.80 89.82 
2014 509 10.37 100 
Total  4906 100   
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3.3 Empirical design 
To empirically test my hypotheses, I follow prior research and develop models to examine 
the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on firm book leverage and firm solvency. More 
specifically to test H1 and H2, I introduce the following empirical models5.  
Model (1) 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
Model (2) 
 
𝐼𝐶𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
1
∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
I consider the variables of interest in my primary models to be exogenously 
determined. Nevertheless, endogeneity is a serious concern and could potentially be 
driving my results. The possibility exists that CEO inside debt holdings and my dependent 
variables are jointly determined. I acknowledge this possibility and run separate 
regressions with all my explanatory variables lagged by one fiscal year to mitigate reverse 
causality concerns. Since pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions can produce 
substantially inflated t-statistics and underestimate standard errors, to reach valid 
statistical inferences, I run both pooled OLS regressions as well as fixed effects 
                                                 
5 In addition to my control variables, I add year dummies to my regressions to account for any annual 
fluctuations in my dependent variable. 
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regressions. I use the fixed effects model (FE) to address any unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. In addition to controlling for time-invariant firm characteristics, robust 
standard errors are clustered at the company level (gvkey) in all my models to correct 
potentially inflated t-statistics due to serial correlation. 
3.4  Variable measurement  
Leverage 
Following Sundaram and Yermack (2007) I use the firm’s book leverage as a proxy 
for the company’s capital structure. I do not use market leverage to mitigate the 
probability that my results are affected by a mechanical relation with my variable of 
interest, CEO relative leverage. I measure leverage as the book value of total debt divided 
by total assets. 
Firm Solvency 
For my second hypothesis, I use an income statement ratio, the interest coverage 
ratio (ICR) as a proxy for firm solvency. I define ICR as operating income divided by 
interest expense. Interest coverage ratios have been used in the past as a measure of 
financial distress (Asquith et al., 1991; Ezzell and Vora, 2001), while Leland (1994,1998) 
shows that ICR covenants may mitigate the incentive of stockholders to increase asset 
volatility. Additionally, Dothan (2006) argues that ICR can serve as an optimal covenant 
and may also lessen managerial incentives to increase firm risk. For these reasons, I 
employ this ratio as a measure of firm solvency, since it serves as an indicator of the 
company's ability to pay the interest on its debt, a higher ratio indicating greater solvency. 
CEO inside debt holdings 
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Furthermore, I control for the effects of variables that have been documented to be 
associated with my dependent variables. With regard to equity compensation incentives, 
prior literature notes a positive association between Delta (defined as the sensitivity of 
the value of the CEO’s accumulated equity-based compensation to a one-percent change 
in the stock price), and effort exerted by managers since their gains are directly related to 
the firm’s stock price (Guay 1999; Coles et al. 2006). Also, Guay (1999) suggests that 
higher delta increases the risk born by managers, while John and John (1993) argue that 
higher delta incentivises managers to shift risk to debtholders. Furthermore, according to 
Coles et al. (2006) CEO Vega (defined as the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s 
accumulated equity-based compensation to a one-percent change in the volatility of stock 
prices) can induce managers to take on riskier projects and implement more aggressive 
financial policies. Hence, I control for the effects of both the Delta, and Vega. I scale 
Vega and Delta by total current CEO compensation; this helps to capture their relative 
importance with regards to CEO total pay (Liu et al., 2014). Also, prior research suggests 
that managers are keen to use internally raised funds available to invest in new projects 
or pay interest on existing debt (Cassel et al., 2012). For this reason, I employ surplus 
cash scaled by total assets as an additional control variable. Furthermore, I introduce an 
indicator variable of a CEO reaching retirement age (NRI) as a control variable as studies 
have documented a significant relationship between age, risk aversion and financial 
policies (Selfling, 2014). 
Also, I use the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book) as a proxy for the investment 
opportunity set of the company since Murphy (1985) reports that CEO pay is higher for 
companies with greater growth prospects and also use a tangibility ratio (Coles et al., 
2006). Additionally, the natural logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for firm size, 
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while return on assets (ROA) is utilised as a proxy for firm performance and profitability, 
factors that according to Core et al. (1999) affect CEO pay. Firm age in a given sample 
year is the number of years since the first year that the company is reported in Compustat. 
Lastly, I introduce a proxy on firm’s financial distress Altman Z-score (ALTZ). 
Furthermore, to control for the potential tax benefits of debt, I add an indicator variable 
(Tax indicator) equal to one (1) if the company is reporting a negative tax carry forward 
and zero (0) otherwise.   
Finally, I include industry and year fixed effects in my models to control for industry 
characteristics and other macroeconomic factors over time. For additional information 
and details on the definition and derivation of each of my model's variables, I refer the 
reader to the Appendix. 
 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for my variables of interest. The descriptive 
statistics indicate that my sample firms are heterogeneous in terms of size (mean and 
median Total Assets are $11.2 and $3 billion, respectively). They also indicate that Total 
Assets is heavily right-skewed so its logarithmic transformation is used in the multivariate 
regression analyses. With regard to the Interest coverage ratio (mean and median are 8 
and 47 respectively), I again witness a heavily right skewed distribution. Therefore, I use 
its logarithmic transformation for the multivariate analyses. I also find that the mean 
(median) CEO debt/equity ratio is 0.63 (0.15) suggesting that, for the majority of my 
sample firms, CEO equity portfolio value exceeds their equivalent inside debt position. 
The average CEO holds more than $8 million in inside debt while a typical CEOs inside 
28 
 
debt holdings are close to $3 million. These results are consistent with previous research 
(Cassell et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014) and indicate that inside debt makes up a more 
significant proportion of CEO wealth than otherwise perceived. The CEO to firm debt to 
equity ratio has mean (median) values of 1.187 (0.252) respectively which are again 
consistent with the respective findings of Liu et al. (2014). Collectively, I document that 
the CEO’s relative leverage ratio is less than the firm’s leverage ratio for the majority of 
my observations which is contradicting the intuition of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
However, as Edmans and Liu (2011) argue, equity incentives are needed for the CEO to 
exert greater effort. As a result, the optimal debt ratio for the CEO should be less than the 
firm’s. Therefore, I am not surprised that the majority of my observations have a relative 
debt-to-equity ratio below one. 
However, my statistics also clearly indicate that the distributions of my CEO relative 
leverage measure are right-skewed. Thus, I use its natural logarithm in the multivariate 
regression analyses for less noisy results. With regards to equity incentives, the typical 
CEO (who remains in his position for 6 years) possesses a mean (median) Vega of 
$216,155 ($92,010), and a mean (median) Delta of $1,577,727 ($359,589) respectively. 




Descriptive statistics  
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample observations for my variables of interest.  For variable definitions, the reader 
is referred to the Appendix. 
 
N Std.dev Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Pension benefits (thousand $) 4906 8908.47 4451.58 0.00 462.21 5100.33 
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Deferred compensation Plans 
(thousand $) 
4906 11561.03 3843.51 161.60 876.47 3015.76 
Inside debt  (thousand $) 4906 16083.46 8295.09 782.65 2959.18 9139.14 
CEO equity holdings (thousand $) 4906 1366695.00 124571.00 8671.45 19456.33 47896.59 
CEO Total compensation (thousand $) 4906 7731.25 7160.34 2934.51 5266.01 8899.01 
CEO Relative leverage  4906 37.01 1.19 0.08 0.25 0.73 
CEO Relative leverage >1 
 
4906 0.38 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO  inside debt to equity holdings 4906 17.15 0.63 0.04 0.15 0.40 
CEO age 4906 6.44 56.22 52.00 56.00 60.00 
CEO tenure 4906 6.53 7.66 3.00 6.00 10.00 
Near retirement indicator 4906 0.46 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CEO Vega 4906 422.28 216.15 23.00 92.02 250.52 
CEO Delta 4906 14141.27 1577.73 146.41 359.59 878.31 
Book Leverage 4906 0.16 0.25 0.14 0.23 0.33 
Interest Coverage Ratio  4906 1405.08 47.35 4.20 8.10 16.27 
Surplus Cash 4906 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.12 
Return on Assets (ROA) 4906 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.09 
Altman Z-score 4906 2.07 3.53 2.23 3.21 4.40 
Market-to-Book  4906 0.87 1.77 1.22 1.54 2.04 
Total assets 4906 28175.36 11142.17 1242.99 3074.27 8636.90 
Tangibility ratio 4906 0.21 0.28 0.12 0.21 0.38 






4906      
 
However, my statistics also clearly indicate that the distributions of my CEO relative 
leverage measure are right-skewed. Thus, I use its natural logarithm in the multivariate 
regression analyses for less noisy results. With regards to equity incentives, the typical 
CEO (who remains in his position for 6 years) possesses a mean (median) Vega of 
$216,155 ($92,010), and a mean (median) Delta of $1,577,727 ($359,589) respectively. 
These figures again suggest that equity-based 
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 Table 3 presents my Pearson correlations. My correlation coefficients show that the 
interrelations between my key variables used in my analysis are acceptable in terms of 
significance and size with one potential matter of concern the high correlation between 
the interest coverage ratio and Altman Z-score (ALTZ). Additionally, there is a high 
interrelation between ALTZ and the market to book ratio. However, this is somewhat 
expected as companies with a lot of investment opportunities engage in financially risky 
activities to pursue them. Because of the high interrelation between ALTZ and ICR and 
the fact that both have been used before to capture aspects of financial distress costs 
(Asquith et al., 1991), I exclude Altman Z-score from my second model analysis. The 
correlation between my relative CEO debt-to-equity ratio measures is 0.591 suggesting 
that, although there is considerable common variation between them, each captures some 
unique information. Furthermore, the correlation between leverage and ICR shows that 
while they share a significant interrelationship (-0.565) both capture and introduce new 






Pearson Correlations (P values are displayed in parentheses)      
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Book Leverage 1 
         
  
            
Log ICR -0.54 1 
         
 
(0.00) 
          
CEO Relative 
leverage 
-0.2 0.2 1 
        
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
         
CEO Relative 
leverage >1 
-0.14 0.2 0.59 1 
       
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Surplus Cash -0.19 0.48 0.18 0.18 1 
      
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
CEO Vega -0.01 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.19 1 
     
 
(0.49) (0.00) (0.35) (0.52) (0.00) 
      
CEO Delta -0.1 0.14 -0.29 -0.1 0.06 0.24 1 
    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
-0.09 0.53 0.17 0.15 0.5 0.12 0.09 1 
   
 
(0.95) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    
Altman Z-score -0.47 0.69 0.18 0.19 0.49 0.1 0.17 0.48 1 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   
Market-to-
Book 
-0.03 0.46 0.14 0.16 0.58 0.16 0.15 0.54 0.66 1 
 
 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
Total assets 0.09 -0.09 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.2 0.02 0.06 -0.21 -0.03 1 
 







3.6.1 The association between CEO inside debt holdings and firm financial policies  
Table 4 presents my empirical results with regard to Hypothesis H1. More 
specifically, I present information results for six alternate specifications of model 
1. Columns 5 and 6 have the dependent variable calculated at time t with the 
independent and control variables lagged by one fiscal year (t-1). Overall, I find a 
negative and significant relationship between firm book leverage and CEO relative 
leverage. However, in specifications 5 and 6 of my model (columns 5 and 6 
respectively), while the coefficient of interest is negative as predicted by theory, it 
is not statistically significant. In columns 1-4 the relationship between CEO relative 
leverage and book leverage is negative and significant at the 1% level. My findings 
suggest that CEOs with large inside debt incentives may seek to mitigate the debt 
burden of their firms. The results presented in columns 5 and 6 though urge me to 
interpret my results with caution even though the rest of my model results agree 
with my theoretical expectations and are consistent with prior literature (Cassel et 
al., 2012). As a robustness check, I repeat my regression analyses using an 
alternative measure for book leverage as denoted by Cassel et al. (2012)6. My 
results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar. More specifically, I find that the 
coefficient on my variable of interest is negative and statistically significant at the 
                                                 
6 Book leverage=(at-ceq)/at 
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1% level except in specifications 5 to 6, where while the coefficient is negative, it 
lacks statistical significance. 
Concerning the rest of my model's variables, I document a negative 
relationship between surplus cash and firm book leverage. These results appear to 
be consistent with the pecking order model as advocated by Myers and Majluf 
(1984) which suggests that managers prioritise the funding of their investments with 
internal funds before seeking other sources of financing. Furthermore, a decrease 
in the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (CEO Delta)7 results in an increase in 
leverage results. Additionally, an increase in risk seeking incentives (CEO Vega) 
results in an increase in firm book leverage. These results are consistent with 
previous research (Coles et al., 2006). Additionally, an increase in ROA and 
Market-to-Book results in an increase in firm book leverage. This relationship is 
expected as borrowing has the potential to affect a company's profitability 
positively through the development of debt-funded capital assets as dictated by the 
cost-benefit analysis. However, borrowing may also prove to be a dangerous 
practice as it raises the financial distress costs of the company, this is evidenced in 
my analyses by the significantly negative association between book leverage and 
ALTZ. 
 
                                                 
7 One possible reason for the weaker significance of Vega in my firm fixed effects specifications according to Coles et al. (2006) is that firm policies and 
Vega are strongly associated in the cross-section but not in the time series. This lack of association in time series may be the reason for the failure of the 





The association between the CEO relative leverage ratio and firm financial policies risk (Book Leverage) 
 This table presents regression results in which the dependent variable is book leverage. In columns 1–4, the dependent 
variable is measured in year t. In columns 5–6, the independent variable is measured in year t-1. Variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix. Each model includes year fixed effects. p-Values (in parentheses) are based on robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level (gvkey). ***, **, And * represent significance at the 1 %, 5 %,and 10 
% levels respectively. 
 
 Book Leverage t Book Leverage t-1 
  (1)Pooled OLS (2 Pooled OLS (3)FE (4)FE (5)FE (6)FE 
Log CEO Relative leverage -0.01***  -0.01***  -0.01  
 (0.000)   (0.003)   (0.541) (0.000) 
CEO Relative leverage >1 -0.02***  -0.01***  -0.01 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.221) 
Surplus Cash -0.45*** -0.47*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.086** -0.14*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.001) 
CEO Delta -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.001 -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.409) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Vega 0.20** 0.17* 0.09* 0.07 0.073 0.07 
 (0.028) (0.064) (0.077) (0.148) (0.193) (0.205) 
Tangibility ratio 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.656) (0.707) (0.375) (0.433) (0.295) (0.389) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.12* 0.12** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.060) (0.049) 
Altman Z-score -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03 0.16** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.353) (0.037) 
Market-to-Book  0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax indicator 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 
 (0.388) (0.344) (0.629) (0.773) (0.738) (0.790) 
Log (Total assets) -0.01 -0.01 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.206) (0.183) (0.007) (0.011) (0.032) (0.026) 
Near retirement indicator 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.911) (0.761) (0.621) (0.865) (0.704) (0.647) 
Firm age -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.731) (0.945) (0.010) (0.006) 
Intercept 0.26*** 0.29*** -0.02 0 0.06 -0.06 
Observations 4906 4906 4906 4906 3892 3892 
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.11 0.11 
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I also document a significant and positive relationship between firm leverage 
and firm age which is consistent with more mature businesses having easier access 
to debt funding. Regarding firm size, I only document a significant and positive 
relation in the fixed effects models. This lack of significance in my pooled OLS 
models could be potentially attributed to its effects being captured by other controls 
and the fact that firm size is not time-variant. 
Lastly, I find no statistically significant relationship with my tangibility proxy 
and the tax and near retirement indicators. Collectively, my findings suggest that 
there exists a negative association between CEO relative leverage and firm book 
leverage. These results are in agreement with prior work who argue that inside debt 
incentives can promote managers to follow less risky corporate policies (Cassel et 
al. 2012; Eisdorfer et al., 2013) 
 
3.6.2 The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and  
          firm  solvency 
For my second hypothesis, I empirically test the association of the CEOs 
relative leverage with the firm’s interest coverage ratio. I employ ICR as a measure 
of a firm's solvency since it provides a decent assessment of a company’s short-
term financial health while it can at the same time capture elements of its 
profitability. 
 Table 5 presents results for six alternative specifications of my model (model 
2) with the logarithm of the Interest coverage ratio (LogICR) being the dependent 
variable. Columns 5 and 6 have the dependent variable calculated at time t with the 
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independent and control variables calculated at time t-1. In all columns, the variable 
of interest is again the natural logarithm of CEO relative leverage and the indicator 
variable CEO relative leverage > 1. Although a sensible control for the model 1 
regression analysis, ALTZ is excluded from the H2 regressions since it measures 
financial distress costs which ICR also captures to a great extent. 
Overall, I document a positive and significant relationship between ICR and 
my two proxies of CEO inside debt incentives in all six of my model specifications. 
Moreover, my results remain not only significant in all my model specifications but 
also display consistency in their economic magnitudes.  
Concerning the rest of my control variables, I document a significant and 
positive relationship between my dependent variable (LogICR) and Surplus cash 
which is reasonable since surplus cash represent funds available to invest in new 
projects which risk-averse managers are known to treat as a contingency measure 
(Liu et al., 2014). Furthermore, I document a significant and positive relationship 
between my dependent variable and firm profitability which is expected since ICR 
are frequently employed as a profitability ratios. 
Additionally, though I document a positive and significant relationship at all 
conventional levels with my investment opportunity set control variable (Market-
to-Book) in my fixed effects models only, in the pooled OLS model coefficients 






The association between the CEO relative leverage ratio and firm financial policies risk (ICR) 
This table presents OLS regression results in which the dependent variable is the Interest Coverage ratio. In columns 1–
4, the dependent variable is measured in year t. In columns 5–6, the independent variable is measured in year t-1. The 
sample is constructed as described in Table 1 and variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. P-Values (in 
parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level (gvkey). Pooled OLS denotes pooled 
OLS regression model while FE denotes a fixed effects panel regression model. ***, **, And * represent significance at 
the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively. 
 Dependent variable 
 
(1)Pooled OLS (2) Pooled OLS (3)FE (4)FE (5)FE (6)FE 
  logICR logICR logICR logICR LogICRt-1 LogICRt-1 







CEO Relative leverage > 1 0.33***  0.21***  0.19*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Surplus Cash 3.92*** 3.97*** 3.74*** 3.72*** 1.35*** 1.32*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO Delta -0.18 0.16 -0.51 -0.28 0.65 0.74 
 
(0.79) (0.81) (0.35) (0.60) (0.16) (0.10) 
CEO Vega 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.03 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.82) (0.19) (0.39) 
Tangibility ratio -1.03*** -1.01*** -1.72*** -1.64*** -2.07*** -2.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 6.30*** 6.43*** 3.83*** 3.89*** 3.00*** 3.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Market-to-Book  0.15*** 0.15*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tax indicator 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.013 
 
(0.53) (0.52) (0.94) (0.75) (0.97) (0.82) 
Log(Total assets) -0.08*** -0.08*** 0.01 0.02 -0.34*** -0.34*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.85) (0.75) (0.01) (0.00) 
Near retirement indicator 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
 
(0.31) (0.20) (0.79) (0.96) (0.50) (0.47) 
Firm age -0.01 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.03*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.52) (0.87) (0.68) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept 2.10*** 1.88*** 1.76*** 1.42** 3.48*** 3.29*** 
Observations 4906 4906 4906 4906 3892 3892 




While one might expect a negative relationship since ICR is a solvency ratio 
which debtholders regularly employ as a restrictive covenant8, the positive sign it 
exhibits has possible explanations. As mentioned before, ICR is both a profitability 
as well as a debt ratio. While risk-averse managers could sacrifice growth 
opportunities to enhance their firm debt serviceability, they can also achieve this by 
reducing the volatility of their operating earnings.  
With regard to firm size, my results are rather interesting in that my coefficient 
signs and statistical significance change between my alternate models. In particular, 
my measure for firm size displays a positive sign in my fixed effects model and no 
statistical significance and is highly significant but negative under all other model 
specifications. The relationship between ICR and firm asset tangibility is also of 
potential interest. In all my model specifications and under all conventional levels 
I document a negative relationship between my tangibility ratio and ICR. One 
possible explanation is that as a firm’s intangible assets (such as patents and brand 
name recognition) increase in value relative to the firm’s tangible assets firm sales 
also increase. Therefore, the firm can service its pre-existing debt obligations by 
capitalising on the effects of its intangible assets and does not require the aid of 
additional debt funding to do so (for which tangible assets are required as 
collateral).  
                                                 
8 While a high ICR can signal high solvency it can also act as an indicator that managers act “too safe” and/or that the firm has low growth prospects. 
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Lastly, in all my models CEO Vega is highly insignificant while CEO Delta is 
only significant in my pooled OLS models. Furthermore, Firm age as well as my 
Tax indicator and Near retirement indicator variables all highly insignificant.  
Overall, my results are consistent with Hypothesis H1 and provide support for 
the theory that managers with significant inside debt incentives become more risk-
averse and tend to mitigate the debt burden of their firms.  
 
3.7 Findings discussion and future research possibilities 
Overall, I document a significant and negative relationship between firm book 
leverage and CEO inside debt incentives and a significant and positive association 
between ICR and CEO inside debt incentives. Collectively, my results suggest that 
CEOs with large inside debt incentives manage their firms more conservatively and 
implement less risky financial policies. 
While my findings are indicative of debt incentivised managers acting more 
conservatively when it comes to implementing firm financial policies, they also 
indicate that perhaps their aim is to increase both the long as well as the short-term 
financial stability and sustainability of the firm. To that extent, it can be theorised 
that inside debt compensation can also affect the operations of the company. In my 
second hypothesis, I established that highly debt incentivised managers increase the 
serviceability of their firm debt. Another potential route is to ensure that operating 
cash flow volatility is less susceptible to fluctuations and at sufficient levels to 
service the company's debt obligations. Therefore, an interesting premise for future 
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research the association between firm operating leverage and CEO inside debt 
incentives.   
3.8 Limitations 
While my results indicate a significant relationship between firm book 
leverage, ICR and CEO inside debt holdings, due to data limitations I only use level 
based inside debt measures and do not adjust my variables for the effect of inflation. 
The first issue is a restriction for my study as my proxies do not account for any 
alterations in the value of equity or debt (Wei and Yermack, 2011). To better 
capture these changes a proxy that estimates the effect of a one-dollar increase in 
firm value on the value of the CEO’s inside debt/equity ratio and the respective firm 
debt/equity ratio would be more appropriate. Also, as prior work suggests that CEO 
cash compensation is significantly debt-like in nature, studies of CEO inside debt 
frequently use the cash adjusted CEO relative leverage as a measure of inside debt 
incentives.  
While I attempt to control for reverse causality and potential endogeneity 
issues, I only manage to mitigate my concerns. I fully acknowledge that 
endogeneity may still be present in my analysis and bias my results. A possible way 
to manage this issue is to employ a model using the two-stage-least-squares 
framework which, provided the correct instruments are chosen, would help increase 
the validity of my results.  
In addition to testing Hypothesis 1, I note the possibility of a mechanical 
relationship existing between firm book leverage and CEO relative leverage. 
Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, ICR has sparsely been used in prior 
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literature as a variable of interest. ICRs may vary among industries and may suggest 
that a company besides solvent is also "too safe" and sacrifices opportunities to 
magnify earnings through leverage. Furthermore, ICR is not a perfect measure of a 
company's financial health. The effect of taxes is not taken into account as they are 
not included in the earnings figure used to derive the ratio. Furthermore, a firm 
could be accruing an interest expense that is not due for actual payment in its current 
fiscal year as denoted by Compustat, so the ratio can indicate a debt obligation that 
does not respond in the current time period. Nevertheless, while I acknowledge its 
limits, I consider ICR a valid estimation measure for the purpose of my analysis as 
it allows me to establish a more robust connection between CEO debt incentives, 




Chapter 4 Small sample analysis 
Inside debt holdings and CEO gender 
4.1 Motivation and theoretical background 
Extant literature suggests that in general, women tend to be more risk-averse 
relative to men. (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Charness and Gneezy, 2012). This 
difference in risk-aversion levels has also been documented in the case of financial 
risk, where men are established to be more over-confident compared to women 
(Barber and Odean, 2001; Huang and Kisgen, 2013). The gender difference in 
financial risk preferences is also supported by Bajtelsmit et al. (1996) who 
document that most women hold a significantly less amount of risky assets in their 
investment portfolios than men. Also, with regard to pension investment choices 
Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1997) suggest that women are more inclined to choose 
fixed income investments, which are considered safer, and hold a smaller amount 
of company stock. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that not only are women more risk 
averse than men when it comes to financial and investment risk, but they also bring 
these qualities on the executive board when appointed to top management positions. 
Faccio et al. (2015) using a sample containing both privately and listed European 
firms document that female-CEO firms exhibit lower leverage and earnings 
volatility and a higher likelihood of survival compared to male CEO ones. 
Furthermore, they conduct a time series analysis and report a decline in overall firm 
risk in the period following the replacement of a male by a female CEOs. Overall, 
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they suggest that female CEOs exhibit lower risk tolerance and a higher likelihood 
to implement less risky financial policies. Consistent with this argument, Huang 
and Kisgen (2013) examine a sample of 116 firms where females hold the position 
of CEO or CFO and document that women tend to act more conservatively when it 
comes to corporate policies relative to men. In particular, they provide evidence 
that women top executives initiate fewer acquisitions and are less inclined to issue 
debt. 
4.1.1 CEO gender and executive compensation 
Besides a difference in financial risk preferences, prior research also 
documents a gender-based disparity when it comes to compensation. This 
difference is known in academic and public cycles as the gender pay gap and 
suggests women in managerial positions receive less compensation compared to 
men (Blau and Kahn, 2000). However, when it comes to the compensation of the 
CEO, a consensus has not been achieved. More specifically, Mohan and Ruggiero 
(2007) develop a non-parametric model that controls for both gender and firm 
performance and document that apart from cash salary female CEOs display 
reduced compensation levels compared to male ones. These results suggest that 
boards under-compensate women top executives and at the same time offer them 
greater cash compensation since it better suits their risk profile. However, Khan and 
Vieito (2013) even though they note the appointment of female CEOs result in 
smaller firm risk levels, find no difference in the proportion of stock option 
compensation between male and female CEOs. Consistent with these results, 
Bugeja et al. (2012) using both a total and a propensity score matched sample fail 
to find any evidence of a gender pay gap. Furthermore, their results indicate that 
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even if women exhibit more conservative and risk averse behaviour compared to 
men, they are not less inclined to accept variable pay that is tied to firm 
performance.  
Overall, women are considered to be more conservative when it comes to their 
personal financial risk relative to men. Furthermore, even when they hold top 
executive positions, they usually continue to be more conservative in their financial 
and investment corporate decisions. In addition to that, investors seem to 
acknowledge this trait of them. In particular, Martin et al. (2009) document a 
reduction in firm risk following the appointment of female CEOs. As a result, one 
would naturally expect compensation committees to design compensation contracts 
based on the CEOs gender characteristics. However, as was mentioned before, 
academic literature provides conflicting results on the matter. While some studies 
identify differences in the structure of compensation packages between genders, 
when it comes to the position of CEO most actually find no difference between the 
pay structure between females and males.  
However, to the best of my knowledge no study has examined the association 
between inside debt compensation and CEO gender. As was discussed above, 
women are according to some studies inherently less risk tolerant than men. 
Furthermore, Huang and Kisgen (2013) study the effect of CEO and CFO gender 
on corporate policy choices in a U.S firm setting and report that female executives 
as less inclined to issue debt and implement more conservative investment policies. 
At the same time, in my large sample analysis, I document that as the inside debt 
holdings of the CEO increase, she becomes more risk averse and seeks to lower the 
debt burden of the firm. Therefore, inside debt seems to provide the CEO with 
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incentives that introduce behaviours which women appear to possess inherently. As 
a result, the examination of the relationship between inside debt compensation and 
CEO gender serves as a very interest premise. 
Therefore, for my small sample analysis, I aim to explore whether any gender-
related differences exist with regard to the CEOs inside debt compensation. As a 
result, I examine whether the proportion of inside debt compensation and the level 
of inside debt incentives offered at female CEOs is different compared to male 
CEOs. 
Consistent with Bugeja et al. (2012), I acknowledge that since agency theory 
provides no formal guidance when it comes to gender-related differences and prior 
empirical evidence do not reach a common consensus on the matter, I am unable to 
form a formal prediction. As a result, I treat the association between CEO inside 
debt compensation and gender as an empirical issue. 
4.2 Data and sample selection  
For my small sample analysis, I construct two subsamples of CEOs based on 
their gender. Due to the imbalance between male and female CEO9, I employ a 
matched sample for my analysis. Previous studies on gender-based pay differences 
also use sample matching techniques (Bugeja et al., 2012). Martin et al. (2009) and 
Mohan and Ruggiero (2003), argue that company size and industry are the primary 
determinants of CEO pay. For this reason, they rank firms in each industry 
                                                 
9 According to a report by Catalyst, a non-profit organisation that advocates for 




according to its size. They then construct their matched pair samples by pairing a 
male CEO firm to each one of their female CEO ones according to their closeness 
in terms of size. However, as discussed by Bugeja et al. (2012), this method may 
produce biased results since it still entails a level of discretion (closeness in terms 
of size) and is only partiality matching samples. For this reason, they use a 
propensity match score to identify matched firms which help overcome these biases 
to a great extent. However, recently developed matching techniques also exist 
which display similar statistical properties that make them desirable. One such 
technique that helps improve causal effect estimation is coarsened exact matching 
(CEM). According to Iacus, Porro, & Stuart (2011) this method, bounds both the 
degree of model dependence and the average treatment effect estimation error 
though ex-ante user choice. Furthermore, CEM is a monotonic imbalance bounding 
technique meaning that the adjustment of the imbalance of one variable does not 
affect the maximum imbalance of any other variable. Lastly, the method is fast 
computationally and is easier in implementation relative to similar techniques. For 
these reasons, I consider CEM as appropriate for my analysis and employ it to 
construct my male CEO control sample. 
Extant literature suggests that executive compensation is significantly affected 
by firm size and industry (Murphy, 1999). Therefore, using SIC codes from 
Compustat, I classify companies into 48 Fama-French industry classifications. 
Subsequently, I employ CEM to identify matching firms according to these two 
factors within fiscal years. As a result, I Identify 69 pairs of male and female CEO 
firms. Overall, I identify a matched control subsample of 69 firm-year observations 
with a male CEO, while my total sample consists of 138 observations. 
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4.3 Empirical design 
In order to examine whether CEO gender affects the level of inside debt 
compensation of the CEO I first conduct a univariate analysis. Subsequently I use 
the following models to examine the relationship in a cross-sectional setting: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 =  𝛽0+  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0+  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0+  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
In addition to year effects I also introduce industry indicators in my models to 
control for industry effects. Since the majority of my firms in my sample are unique 
I follow Bugeja et al. (2012) and do not control for firm fixed effects. Furthermore, 
for the third model I follow prior literature (Sundaram and Yermarc, 2007; Cen, 
2010) and employ a Tobit framework to estimate my regressions since the variable 
Match_Rate possesses a lower limit at zero (0)10 . 
In all my models, my primary variable of interest is Fem_CEO which is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one (1) if the CEO is female and zero (0) 
otherwise.  
                                                 
10 This is due to the fact that certain firms do not match their employs contribution at all.  
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4.4 Variable measurement 
4.4.1 Dependent variables 
The logarithmic transformation of inside debt LogInsideDebt and inside debt 
incentives Log CEO relative leverage are used as dependent variables to measure 
the inside debt position of the CEO and her inside debt incentives respectively. For 
further information on these variables the reader is kindly referred to subsection 3.4 
in the large sample analysis and the Appendix.  
In addition, I follow Cen (2010) and introduce a new variable to measure how 
much the firm is encouraging the CEO to contribute to executive compensation 
plans Match_Rate. I define this variable as the ratio of the total firm contributions 
to deferred compensation plans for the last fiscal year to the total contributions of 
the CEO to deferred compensation plans for the last fiscal year.  
4.4.2 Firm specific characteristics 
Consistent with my large sample analysis I use the natural logarithm of total 
assets as a control proxy for firm size. Furthermore, I use the Market-to-Book 
(MTB) ratio and Return on Assets (ROA) as controls for the firm’s investment 
opportunity set and performance respectively. Also, stock return volatility and book 
leverage are used as a control for firm risk (Core et al., 1999).  
4.4.3 CEO characteristics 
Consistent with previous studies on the determinants of executive 
compensation I introduce controls for the experience and managerial power of the 
CEO. Following Bugeja et al. (2012) I employ the logarithmic transformation of 
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current CEOs tenure LogTenure as an indicator of his influence and experience. 
Furthermore, Prior studies argue that CEOs who also Chair the board of directors 
are more powerful and can command higher compensation (Bebchuck et al., 2002; 
Bebchuck and Fried, 2003). For this reason, I introduce a dummy variable (Dual) 
that takes the value of one (1) if the CEO if also the Chairman of the board and zero 
(0) otherwise. Lastly, since previous studies report that the compensation of the 
CEO is atypical in her first year of service I use an indicator variable First_Year to 
control for this phenomenon (Bugeja et al., 2012). 
4.5 Findings 
Table 6 presents summary statistics on the total sample partitioned by gender. 
As one can see, there appears to be no significant difference between my two 
samples in terms of size which is suggestive of a successful matching. Since the 
variables Insidedebt and CEO relative leverage appear to be heavily right skewed I 






Descriptive statistics for the full sample of female & male CEO firms partitioned by gender(N=138). 
 
Proportions of compensation components are calculated as the ratio of the component awarded to the CEOs 
total compensation for the past fiscal year. 
 Female CEO firms Male CEO firms   
Number of observations 69 69   
  Mean Median Q3 St.dev Mean Median Q3 St.dev 
CEO compensation characteristics (thousand $)           
Total Compensation  7538 5794 9767 5434 10850 6467 11195 18492 
Total Current Compensation 1198 1082 1375 834 1102 955 1171 626 
Inside Debt 7718 2828 14278 8487 11757 3884 11072 26452 
         
Proportions of CEO compensation components  (%)         
Restricted Stock 0.42 0.5 0.67 0.3 0.41 0.42 0.61 0.26 
LTIP 0.02 0 0 0.07 0.01 0 0 0.05 
Stock Options 0.27 0.26 0.46 0.24 0.3 0.32 0.47 0.26 
Current Compensation 0.28 0.21 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.21 0.31 0.19 
CEO personal characteristics         
Age 53.1 53.5 56 5.85 55.58 55 58 6.63 
Tenure 4.28 3.5 6 2.92 7.31 6 9 5.35 
Chair/CEO 0.41 0 1 0.49 0.41 0 1 0.49 
Match Rate  1.24 0.41 0.75 5.58 0.53 0.22 0.58 1.08 
CEO Relative leverage 0.77 0.32 0.89 1.21 1.07 0.31 1.08 2.02 
Firm characteristics             
Book Leverage (%) 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.18 0.25 0.26 0.35 0.16 
Return Volatility (%) 0.3 0.27 0.33 0.11 0.39 0.32 0.4 0.25 
Cash Holdings (thousand $) 712 277 680 1304 1434 235 896 4493 
Return on Assets (ROA) (%) 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.07 
Market-to-Book  2.04 1.68 2.35 1.05 2.17 1.82 2.69 1.02 





4.5.1 Univariate analysis 
To test for any inside debt compensation and inside debt incentives disparities 
between male and female CEOs I follow prior research and first conduct a t-test and 
a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Table 7 presents the results of the tests on the 
means and medians of the variables for both sub-groups. In addition to inside debt 
holdings I also test the compensation structure of both genders for potential 
differences Therefore, I also conduct tests on the proportions of their restricted 
stock, option and long-term incentive plan (LTIP) awards relative to total 
compensation. If the board acknowledged the female CEO as inherently risk-
averse, one would perhaps expect the board to award females with a higher stock 
option proportion relative to their total compensation than male CEOS. At the same 
time, if female CEOs are risk-averse one would expect them to use their bargaining 
power to extract higher cash compensation (Mohan and Ruggiero, 2007). 
According to the univariate test results on both the means and medians for both 
genders there appears to be no statistically significant difference between their total 
compensation. Furthermore, while male CEOs appear to be compensated with a 
higher proportion of stock options relative to women CEOs, the difference lacks 
statistical significance. Overall, my test results produce no evidence nor are 
indicative of a difference between the compensation (and compensation 
components) of female and male CEOs. These results are consistent with those 
reported by Bugeja et al. (2012)  
With regard to inside debt compensation and the debt-based incentives, on 
average women CEOs receive less inside debt compensation but have a higher 
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relative leverage ratio. Also, firms appear to provide more incentives to female 
executives to defer their pay and increase their inside debt position as a result. 
However; all these differences lack any statistical significance. 
Regarding firm characteristics, firms with female CEOs display no statistically 
significant difference with male CEO firms in terms of leverage, cash holdings and 
performance. However, I document a statistically significant difference between 
CEO gender when it comes to firm return volatility. In particular, the return 
volatility of female-led companies is significantly smaller than that of their male 
counterparts at the 1% level. Furthermore, women CEOs display significantly lower 
tenure and are younger when they attain the position of CEO. 
  Overall, my univariate tests appear consistent with the those of Bugeja et al. 
(2012) and point me to the direction that no difference exists between the 






Tests of difference on the means and medians of female & male CEO Firms  (n=136) 
This table presents the difference of means t-tests as well as the results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of difference. 
For variable definitions, the reader is referred in the Appendix. ***, **, And * denote significance of the t-statistic at 
the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively. 
  T-test for difference of means Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test 
 Difference of means P value Difference of medians P value 
CEO  compensation characteristics 
 
CEO Total Compensation 
(thousand $) 
 
-3312 0.15 -673 0.6 
Total Current Compensation 
(thousand $) 
 
96 0.4 127 0.88 
Inside Debt (thousand $) -4039 0.23 -1056 0.41 
Proportions of CEO compensation components (%) 
Restricted Stock 0.01 0.84 0.08 0.72 
LTIP 0.01 0.45 0.08 0.64 
Stock Options -0.03 0.45 -0.06 0.56 
Current Compensation -4039 0.67 0 0.89 
CEO characteristics 
Age -2.48 0.02 *** -1.5 0 
tenure -3.03 0.00*** -2.5 0.00*** 
Dual (Chair/CEO) 0.05 0.2 0 0.97 
Match Rate 0.71 0.28 0.19 0.2 
CEO Relative leverage -0.3 0.3 0.01 0.34 
Firm characteristics 
Book Leverage (%) 0.01 0.84 0 0.94 
Return Volatility (%) -0.09 0.08*** -0.05 0.06 * 
Return on Assets (ROA) (%) 0.01 0.37 0 0.53 
Market-to-Book  -0.13 0.47 -0.14 0.23 




4.5.2 Multivariate analysis 
In addition to the univariate analysis, I also proceed to test whether female 
CEOs display any differences when it comes to their inside debt position and 
incentives compared to male CEOs in a multivariate setting. For this reason, I 
conduct a regression analysis. 
Table 8 provides the results of the pooled cross-sectional regression on the 
matched sample of male and female CEO firms. The coefficient of my main 
variable of interest Fem_CEO while positive in all three model specifications lacks 
any statistical significance. In particular, it appears that female CEOs are not 
incentivised to defer a bigger part of their pay, do not possess a higher inside debt 
position and are not more incentivised by inside debt compared to male CEOs. 
These results are consistent with my univariate analysis and suggest that once an 
individual becomes CEO no gender bias occurs with regards to her remuneration. 
Concerning the rest of my model’s variables, book leverage displays a negative 
and insignificant association with both Log inside debt and a negative and 
significant relationship with Log CEO relative leverage. These results are 
consistent with both my large sample analysis as well as previous studies (Cassel et 
al., 2012; Cen, 2010). Furthermore, I document a positive but insignificant 
relationship between ROA, Log CEO relative leverage and Loginsidedebt. This 
positive relationship, although statistically insignificant, is expected as firms with 
strong performance can be considered safer and as a result raise no concerns on 
their CEOs when it comes to the security of their inside debt position. Furthermore, 
it is a common practice for deferred compensation awards to be tied to accounting 
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measures of performance and therefore, a higher ROA can translate into a higher 
deferred bonus for the executive (Murphy, 1999).   
Log tenure is also positively and significantly associated with CEO inside debt 
holdings, something that is expected as the longer the tenure of the executive, the 
higher the actuarial present value of her accumulated pension benefits (Sundaram 
Yermack, 2007). Cen (2011) also documents that as the executive reaches 
retirement age their personal leverage tends to decrease, as a result the negative but 
insignificant association between Log tenure and Log CEO relative leverage raises 
no concerns. Also I document a positive and significant association between firm 
size and the CEOs inside debt holdings, which is in agreement with prior literature 
that suggests that larger firms compensate their CEOs more (Murphy, 1999). 
Also, I document a positive and statistically significant association between 
inside debt and the market to book ratio. Furthermore, the association between CEO 
relative leverage and Market-to-Book is also positive and statistically significant. 
These results would suggest that, as the investment opportunity set of the firm 
increases, so does the inside debt holdings of the CEO. These results are counter-
intuitive and inconsistent with prior literature (Cen, 2010). Specifically, one would 
not expect firms with high growth opportunities to increase the inside debt 
compensation of the CEO but pay the executive with equity instead.  
Concerning model 3, I document a positive but insignificant association 
between Match_Rate and Fem_CEO. The only variable in the whole model that is 
statistically significant is ROA. Specifically, it appears that, as the return on assets 
of the firm decreases, the contribution match of the CEO increases. This can be due 
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to the fact that, as the performance of the firm is falling, the CEO reduces her 
voluntary contributions to the firm’s executive deferred compensation plans.  
Overall, I document no evidence that the gender of the CEO serves as a 
determinant of inside debt compensation. However, the documented association 
between Market-to-Book and Log CEO relative leverage appears inconsistent with 





Pooled cross-sectional regression on the matched sample of male and female CEO firms 
This table presents pooled cross sectional regression results on the CEM matched sample of 138 female and male CEOs. 
The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of inside debt, the natural logarithm of the CEO relative leverage and 
the contribution match rate. For more information on the variables definitions and construction the reader is referred 
to the Appendix. As the majority of the sample firm observations are unique no control for firm fixed effects is included. 
P-Values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level (gvkey). ***, **, And 
* represent significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively. 
Independent variables Dependent variable 
 LogInsidedebt Log CEO Relative leverage Match rate 
    
Fem_CEO 0.29 0.25 0.02 
 (0.30) (0.46) (0.89) 
Power 0.41 0.60 -0.09 
 (0.20) (0.47) (0.37) 
Log tenure 0.72** -0.20** 0.20 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.21) 
First year 0.30 -0.40 0.02 
 
(0.54) (0.32) (0.86) 
Book Leverage -1.04 -3.60*** 0.01 
 (0.46) (0.00) (0.33) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 3.63 6.10 -5.69** 
 (0.28) (0.15) (0.42) 
Return Volatility -0.06 -0.29 -0.17 
 (0.90) (0.81) (0.28) 
Market-to-Book  0.52* 0.50** 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.25) 
Tax indicator -0.18 -0.04 -0.10 
 (0.53) (0.88) (0.21) 
Log(Total assets) 0.40** 0.02 0.025 
 (0.01) (0.88) (0.66) 
    
    
Intercept 5.24*** -1.80 1.18** 
 (0.003) (0.29) (0.02) 
Year effects yes Yes yes 
Industry effects yes Yes yes 
Observations 138 138 138 









4.6 Findings discussion and future research possibilities 
Overall, I do not produce evidence of gender-based disparities in the inside 
debt compensation of female and male CEOs. As a result, my findings are more 
aligned with the camp in academic literature that suggests that no gender pay gaps 
exists for executives holding the position of CEO.  
 Even though my study displays several limitations, the research subject serves 
as a very interesting premise for future research. Some possible routes would be to 
examine whether my results truly hold, by conducting a more rigorous analysis 
using a larger sample and additional sample matching and econometric methods. 
Additionally, one could investigate whether any gender-based disparities exist with 
regard to inside debt in other levels of managements besides that of the CEO.  
4.7 Limitations 
Nevertheless, my study is subject to several limitations. First and foremost, due 
to the imbalance between male and female CEO observations I use a matched 
sample to conduct my analysis. For this reason, I employ a novel method CEM 
which in the past has been used in studies of the gender pay gap albeit never in the 
U.S.A firm context (Paredes, 2012). As a result, the chance exists that CEM 
produces a sample that can lead to biased results. Besides the benefits it provides in 
the process of matching female and male CEO firms, the use of CEM also results 
in significant observation loss. Perhaps a way to alleviate these concerns with 
regard to matching would be the utilisation of an alternative method as a robustness 
measure such as the propensity score. Furthermore, with regards to my multivariate 
analysis, due to the construction of my matched sample and time limitations, I 
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cannot dispute the presence of endogeneity and its potential effects on my results. 
Also, due to data limitations, I am only able to partially control for the firm’s board 
and governance characteristics which can result in omitted-variable bias. As a 
result, my findings should only be viewed as indicative and serve as a motivation 





Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This dissertation focuses on the effect of inside debt compensation on 
managerial risk-seeking behaviour. In particular, it examines the effect of inside 
debt compensation on firm financial policy choices. Prior literature suggests that 
CEOs with large inside debt holdings are more aligned with debtholders and exhibit 
a lower tolerance for firm financial risk (Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassel et al., 
2012). Based on this theoretical prediction, I investigate the potential effect of CEO 
inside debt holdings on firm financial policies. Specifically, I use a comprehensive 
sample of 3906 observations and examine the association between CEO inside debt 
holdings and firm book leverage. Furthermore, I argue that as the inside debt 
holdings of the manager increase, they also take measure to improve the company’s 
short-term financial health. Thus, I also examine the relationship between CEO 
inside debt holdings and the firms interest coverage ratio.  
I report a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and book 
leverage and a positive relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and firm 
solvency. Overall, my findings indicate that inside debt incentives can induce the 
CEO to become more conservative, improve firm solvency and avoid risky 
financial policies. These results are consistent with extant literature, which suggests 
that the introduction of debt-like instruments in the CEOs compensation can affect 
corporate policy choices (Eisdorfer et al., 2012; Cassel et al., 2012). 
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Based on my large sample analysis results and motivated by extant literature 
on the effect of CEO gender on the risk of corporate policies, I also examine 
whether women are compensated with similar levels of inside debt to men. 
However, my results do not provide evidence of a difference in the inside debt 
position between male and female CEOs.  
Overall, this dissertation complements existing research on inside debt 
compensation and its effect on corporate financial policies. Moreover, it also 
extends literature on the existence of gender-based compensation differences for 
corporate executives. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first analysis to examine 
whether executives receive different inside debt compensation based on their 
gender and risk profile. Furthermore, it also employs an alternative matching 
method to propensity scored matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), which 






Variable definitions  
Book Leverage  
Total Debt in Current Liabilities (dlc) plus total Long-Term Debt (dltt) divided by total assets (at). An alternative measure 
is calculated by dividing total debt (at-ceq) by the book value of total assets(at).  
 
Log of Interest coverage ratio (ICR) 
The natural log of the interest coverage ratio (ICR). Calculated as earnings before interest and taxes (Ebit) divided by 
total interest paid by the firm (xint+intc). 
Match_Rate 
The ratio of the total firm contributions to deferred compensation plans for the last fiscal year (defer_contrib_co_tot) 
to the total contributions of the CEO to deferred compensation plans for the last fiscal year (defer_contrib_exec_tot)  
Log of CEO Relative leverage 
The natural logarithmic transformation of the ratio of the CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio to the firm’s leverage ratio. Where 
CEO inside debt holdings is calculated as sum of the present value of accumulated pension benefits and deferred 
compensation; CEO equity holdings is denoted as (Shrown_excl_opts_val + optval_tot). The firms leverage ratio is 
calculated as total debt (lt) divided by the market value of equity (csho*prcc_f). 
 
CEO Relative leverage > 1 
 
An indicator variable set equal to one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is greater than one, and zero otherwise. 
 
Log of Total assets 
The natural logarithm of total firm assets (at). 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
The ratio of operating income before depreciation (oibdp) scaled by the book value of total assets (at). 
 
Market-to-Book ratio 
Market-to-Book ratio is computed as market value of equity (csho*prcc_f) plus total liabilities (lt) divided by the book 
value of total assets (at) 
 
Surplus Cash 
Calculated as the net cash flow from operations (oancf) less depreciation expense (dpc) plus research and development 
expenditures (xrd), scaled by the book value of total assets (at). 
 
Near retirement indicator (NRI) 







An indicator variable set equal to one if the company incurs a negative tax carry forward, and zero otherwise. 
 
Tangibility ratio 
The ratio of the total net value of Property, Plant and Equipment (ppent) scaled by total assets (at). 
 
Firm age 
The age of the firm measured based on its earliest appearance in Compustat. 
Altman Z-Score 
Calculated based on the following formula ALTZ = 1.2*nwc + 1.4*re/at + 3.3*Ebit/at + 0.6*(csho*prcc_f)/lt + Sale/at.  
[Re =retained earnings.] [nwc =net working capital.] [Re =retained earnings.] [ebit =earnings before interest and tax.] 
[csho*prcc_f =Market value of the firm.]  [sale =sales turnover (net).] [lt =total firm liabilities.] [at =Total assets.] 
 
CEO Delta 
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